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Abstract
What information is available in biometric features besides that needed for the
biometric recognition process? What if a biometric feature contains Personally
Identifiable Information? Will the whole biometric system become a threat to
privacy? This paper is an attempt to quantifiy the link between biometrics and
privacy. For a number of biometric-personal(ity) combinations, the availability,
detectability and retrievability of Personally Identifiable Information from bio-
metric features is calculated. This paper should make the reader more aware of
the possibilities in this area and inspire further research. By the use of a meta-
analysis, the possible risks of the fingerprint biometric and three personal(ity)
traits are inventoried. Based on d′-values the retrievability of Personally Iden-
tifiable Information is determined. The results show that in all three possible
biometric-personal(ity) combinations Personally Identifiable Information can be
retrieved better than 50/50 guessing. This implies storing biometric data in the
clear can be a threat to privacy.
1 Introduction
Biometrics authentication has the advantage, over tokens and keys, that biometrics
cannot be forgotten, and disclosure to a third party is difficult. In the case of a
lost token, this can easily be replaced by providing a new password or changing the
lock. If someone steals your biometric information- by taking your finger print from
a shiny surface or a downloaded database - this is not replaceable, and you have a
problem. Your biometric information is yours, uniquely for you, irreplaceable, almost
unchangeable and provided only once.
All biometric information is classified as Personally Identifiable Information (PII).
PII is all information that can be used to distinguish, trace, or be linked to an indi-
vidual. This includes a wide range of information, for example; name, social security
number or information that can be linked to race, geographical indicators and educa-
tional information. Included in PII are also personal characteristics, facial pictures,
fingerprints and other biometric information or stored template data [7]. The treat-
ment of PII is described in the Federal Law. This law is at least applicable for Canada,
the United States of America, the member states of the European Union, the United
Kingdom and Ireland.
The importance of protecting biometric information lies in its sensitivity and trace-
ability to an individual. Jain describes eight possible places to attack within a generic
biometric system [6]. One of the places of interest is just after the sensor level, during
the communication to the next module. The sensor is the earliest place in the system
that comes in touch with PII. This implies that the whole biometric system becomes
privacy sensitive and needs to be handled with special care.
The patterns in biometrics are unique and thus can be used to determine our iden-
tity. What if a biometric contains more information than needed for the identification
process? For example, information that also can be classified as PII. If this is the case,
threats to the privacy of a user or a whole group can occur. To eliminate this threat,
in an ideal situation, all PII needs to be removed as early as possible, preferably at the
sensor level.
Imagine a fingerprint authentication system with knowledge of biometrics and gen-
der differences. If this is a corrupt system, it can discriminate on gender, and only
allow females to pass. This may seem like an innocent example. Imagine however the
biometric system would know if you used drugs the last two days or reveals something
about your sexual orientation based on the retinal veins.
In this research, a meta-analysis is used to gather information about the biometric
and personal(ity) topics. Publications from different domains are used in the analysis.
The analysis is based on the descriptive statistics and the statistical conclusions of
correlations between biometric features and the personal(ity) traits. This research
aims to provide a helicopter view of the field where the biometrics correlate with the
personal(ity) traits from a privacy perspective. We use the main research question:
“Can a biometric feature reveal Personally Identiable Information about that person?”.
A personality trait can become visual in certain parts of biometric features. To test
this research question, the finger print biometric is analysed and the correlation with
a three personal(ity) traits are shown. The main research question will be answered
with the use of two subquestions.
Q1: Is the PII present in quantitative features? Which biometric and which specific
feature contain PII?.
Q2: What is the probability density function (retrievability) on a specific biometric
feature and PII?
An overview of possible privacy threats by biometric features will be provided,
which should make people reconsider privacy and inspire further research. The current
research is far from complete and could be extended in many ways. Thus, this paper
is not about the latest high-tech discoveries or identification methods. This initial
research shows some more relations between biometrics and personality.
2 Materials and Methods
2.1 Literature
This analysis is based on papers from different research fields. All these fields touch
on biometrics and personal(ity) traits, and all the papers are written in different styles
specific for that field or journal. The fields of Biometrics, Anthropology, and Forensic
are involved in this analysis. To be included in the analysis, a paper had to be written
in the English or Dutch language, and a full-text be available to us.
The general method for finding studies was a search in the The University Library,
Google Scholar, ScienceDirect, and JSTOR for articles. The aim was a search for
information about the relation between biometrics and personal(ity) traits.
The information needed about the biometric traits is preferably in the quantified
form. In this way information statistics can be used to describe the biometric and
determine the prevalence of the personal(ity) trait. Studies that are vague about the
test sample and size, are excluded from the analysis.
2.2 Data Analysis
2.2.1 Biometric Data Description
The physiological biometric feature chosen in this research is the fingerprint. Biometrics
in general have multiple visual properties that can be measured. One property of
measurement is chosen for comparison. Note that if a biometric appears not to correlate
to a personal(ity) trait, this only applies for this specific method of measurement. The
property used for fingerprints used is the Total Ridge Count (TRC). This is the count
of ridges on a square of 25mm2 on the tip of the finger. It is not overwhelmingly clear
if this square is rotated for higher ridge count. The ridges are counted on a line from
one of the corners to one of the diagonally opposite corners. In general, the average
ridge count of one hand is used.
An alternative method that is used to determine the TRC, uses the core point
and the triradial point, which is also known as the delta point. Here the ridges are
counted between these two points. Unfortunately, this method fails in cases where no
or multiple triradial points are found. In the case of an arch pattern as a fingerprint
this method will also fail, because there is no triradial point [10, 16]. Due to this, the
related papers are only limitedly used in the analysis.
2.2.2 Description of used Personally Identifiable Information
The Personally Identifiable Information(PII), investigated in combination with the fin-
gerprint data is:
Gender: What is someone’s sex, or better specified as the biological gender of a person
divided into male and female.
Ethnicity: What ethnicity someone has. This is roughly split in African Americans,
Caucasians, Orientals, and Latinos. In some cases ‘sub’-ethnicities are used, for exam-
ple Pakistani and Malaysian.
Sexual Orientation: The sexual preference of a person. Here, only the distinction is
made between heterosexual and homosexual males and females.
2.2.3 Data Presentation
All articles were analyzed for biometric, personal(ity) trait, method of gathering and
ethnicity. Also important is the sample distribution information (µ and σ). The
difference between two samples is calculated and illustrated by the d′-value. The d′
can be calculated by Equation 1, in case of two equal standard deviations (σ1 = σ2)
replace the denominator with σ [18, 19, 20].
d′ =
(µ1 − µ2)√
σ21+σ
2
2
2
(1)
The d′ measures the sensitivity between two conditions/groups [20]. The p-value
shows if there is a difference between the average of two groups. From the distribu-
tion information, the d′ and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, can be
constructed. The retrieval rate can be found by calculating the area under the curve
(AUC) of the ROC and is a value between the 0.5 and 1. The bigger the number, the
better the result. The ROC’s can also be expressed as the true positive rate versus the
false positive rate. In this case, when a certain level of exception is wanted, what is
the probability of a wrong gender conclusion?
For a better understanding of the topic, an example is described more in-depth:
The relationship between the TRC of a fingerprint and the gender of a person. The
(sub)hypothesis is: “females have a higher ridge count than men”. Females have more
fine grained bodies than men, thus smaller finger width and smaller ridges, which gives
a higher ridge count on a fixed 25mm2 area.
3 Results
3.1 General results
The outcome of the data-analysis, is shown in Table 1. The table contains the statistical
conclusions, the predictability expressed in d′ and the AUC for all studies found.
The PII Gender shows a relation with fingerprints. In this specific relation, all
results show significant correlations. The d′ varies in each specific method and therefor
so does the AUC. Ethnicity and Orientation are less strongly related to biometric
features. Only one significant result was found and both the d′ and AUC are low. This
might be due to do the size of the research field or the ethical problems encountered.
3.2 Gender recognition based on the Finger Print Ridge Count
In the literature, there are four methods described for collecting the total ridge count
of a finger. These are; the 25mm2-method, the difference between the core point and
the triradial- or delta point, the stretched single centimeter and the method described
by Penrose [9]. There are also two publications where no method is described [15, 17].
An overview of the results can be found in Table 1.
All the found p-values are significant and a weighted average d′ is 1.68. This indi-
cates that at a hit rate of .8, there is a false hit rate around .2. The results for the
25mm2-method are really good. The p-values are all significant, all except one are even
lower than 0.001. The weighted d′ is bigger than 2. All, except one, show a high effect
size r (> .8). A possible explanation for the single research with low results might be
its limited sample size.
The delta-method has significant p-values, but the d′ values are low. This is also
applicable for the Penrose-method. This means that there is a difference between the
average of the two groups, but the overlap between the two distributions is too big to
successfully identify the gender of a random observation from the sample. The stretched
centimeter method has a large d′, but no p-value was available.
The total sample contains participants from several ethnic samples, with an age
ranging from 5 till 67 years old. The results show that, as was expected, the ridge
count in all populations is higher for the females than for males. However, there are
a few exceptions where it is the other way around. A suitable explanation for these
occurrences is not found. On the other hand, in some of the research it is not described
how the researchers acquired the finger prints or obtained other information about the
sample [5, 9, 10, 15, 17]. It is notable that two of the “exceptions” both used the
Triradial-method [5, 10]. Another conspicuous observation can be distinguished in the
Spanish sample. They have the most fine grained fingertips by far, both on male and
female.
Thus, the eight studies found which used the 25mm2-method, all have high signif-
icant results, but can these results be based on coincidence? Meta-analysis can be
biased by the file-drawer effect. This is caused by research papers with insignificant
results which don’t get published and end up in file drawers or archives instead of in
journals. Rosenthal’s “fail-safe” N is a measure that indicates this number of studies.
Formula 2 calculates this number of articles that is needed to bring the overall result
to a critical level of significance. Here N is the number of studies in the analysis, Zc is
the critical value of Z and Z¯0 is the mean Z obtained for the N studies [14].
Nfs = (N/Z
2
c )(NZ¯
2
0 − Z2c ) (2)
For the 25mm2-method, this value is calculated at 137. So there must be 137 studies
with no results to make all the already found results ineffectual. By the rule of thumb
the minimal fail-safe Nfs has to be 5 × N + 10. In our case this would be a minimal
number of 50 studies. This shows that our analysis is in the safe zone.
3.3 Privacy threat populations and biometrics
After an in depth example where the precision of PII retrieval from biometric features is
described, an overview of the best scoring biometric/personal(ity) combinations follows.
The best scoring features are in fact the biggest threats to privacy and are marked in
yellow, see Table 1.
Table 1: Fingerprint - Statistical Infromation
Pop N(♂/♀) µ σ d′ P AUC Ref
Gender
25mm2-method
AA 100/100 10.90/12.61 1.15/1.43 1.32 Sig∗∗∗ 0.824 [1]
Cau 100/100 11.14/13.32 1.31/1.24 1.71 Sig∗∗∗ 0.866 [1]
IN 40/40 13.18/13.53 2.74/2.90 0.12 Sig∗ 0.535 [2]
ES 100/100 16.23/17.91 1.39/1.47 1.17 Sig∗∗∗ 0.797 [3]
IN 250/250 12.80/14.60 0.90/0.09 2.82 Sig∗∗∗ 0.927 [8]
IN 100/100 11.05/14.20 1.11/0.63 3.48 Sig∗∗∗ 0.993 [11]
Mix 150/150 11.63/13.98 - - Sig∗∗∗ [12]
CN 100/100 11.73/14.15 1.07/1.04 2.30 Sig∗∗∗ 0.948 [12]
MY 50/50 11.44/13.63 0.99/0.91 2.31 Sig∗∗∗ 0.949 [12]
Delta-method
UK 825/825 14.50/12.72 5.11/5.25 0.34 Sig∗∗∗ 0.596 [5]
US 429/457 12.48/11.34 3.16/3.64 0.33 Sig∗∗∗ 0.593 [10]
Penrose-method
IR 100/100 16.65/16.09 1.98/1.92 0.29 Sig∗ 0.580 [9]
Stretched Single Centimeter
US 100/100 10.35/12.7 0.63/0.83 3.20 - 0.988 [13]
No Method Described
GR L(43/52) 13.34/12.34 7.4 /5.9 0.15 - 0.542 [15]
GR R(43/52) 14.60/12.99 7.0/5.8 0.25 - 0.570 [15]
IN 250 14.36/10.65 - - - - [17]
IN 75 14.26/12.50 2.22/2.87 0.68 Sig∗∗∗ 0.686 [17]
Ethniticy
Cau/AA ♂(100/100) 11.14/10.90 1.31/1.15 0.19 NS 0.555 [1]
Cau/AA ♀(100/100) 13.32/12.61 1.24/1.43 0.53 Sig∗ 0.646 [1]
CN/MY ♂(100/50) 11.73/11.44 1.07/0.99 0.28 - 0.579 [12]
CN/MY ♀(100/50) 14.15/13.63 1.04/0.91 0.53 - 0.647 [12]
Sexual orientation
Difference Triradial & Core Point (Hetrosexuals / Homosexuals)
Mix ♂(186/66) 33.0/32.6 8.6/7.7 0.05 NS 0.514 [4]
US ♂(169/164) 63.0/61.3 15.6/16.2 0.11 NS 0.530 [10]
US ♀(117/164) 57.7/55.2 18.7/18.7 0.13 NS 0.538 [10]
∗p < .05. ∗∗p < .01. ∗∗∗p < .001.
4 Discussion
This literature review aimed to explore the privacy threats within biometric features.
Each result shows a better retrieval rate than guessing. The finger-gender combination
shows the best result, so there is evidence that confirms the hypothesis. Not all results
show a significant relation. However, this is not a problem, since if even one study
exists which shows a significant result, a threat occurs. This means there is a threat
for that particular group, with the use of a certain method for that biometric to that
specific personal(ity) trait. Although it is not generalizable, it applies for a smaller
group.
Some results are more convincing than others, but there are only a few results
where almost all studies found no correlation between the biometric feature and the
personal(ity) trait. This can be the result of the single way of measurement for a
biometric. Perhaps, there is a correlation available for a biometric, but only when
there is a different method of measurement. For the fingerprint, we only used the TRC
as method, but the fingerprint has more characteristics such as the patterns of the
print (Henry Classification), the Minutiae patterns and perhaps an another (not yet
found) method.
4.1 Finger/Gender
The (sub)research question “have females a higher ridge count than men?” can, based
on Table 1, be validated. This applies for the 25mm2-method. All of the studies showed
a significant p-value, which means that the there is a difference between the average
of the two groups. An average d′-value of more than 2 and thus a high AUC indicates
that the distributions do not overlap much. This means that at a hit rate of .8, there
is a miss rate of .09. Besides, the fail-over N shows that this is a stable measurement.
Overall, the ridges are thinner in detail for females, and thus have higher ridge
density compared to males. We have seen that female fingerprints tended to have
thinner epidermal ridges. The average fingerprint has, depending on the sample, 13
ridges / 25mm2. A lower ridge count is more likely to be masculine, while a higher
ridge count has a higher probability to be feminine.
No suitable explanation was found why females in five samples had lower ridge
counts than males. As mentioned, in the Results section this can be method related.
Another possibility, in the case of the study of Mustanski, is the usage of a mixed
sexual orientation sample [10]. In other studies this is not explicitly mentioned. So
this can partly imply that, under the assumption that sexual orientation is hormonally
based, the construction of a fingerprint is not fully based on gender, but also based on
hormones.
Based on the results of the different studies, it can be concluded that it is possible
to determine if a fingerprint is male or female. This is based on quantification of
the average total ridge count, compared to an overall average. It must be noted that
this only works well if you know from which population the print originates. The
population, or the continent, should be a parameter in the test on detectability, to
determine gender from a fingerprint.
5 Future work
The current research can be extended by adding categories in biometrics or in the
measurement of the different biometric characteristics. An extension in personal(ity)’s
is also possible, think of diseases or habits such as smoking, drinking, and drug use.
There is a reasonable chance a correlation exists between smoking, drinking, or drug
use and vein thickness, or the retina vein diameter. Another example is the relationship
between the palm print and Down Syndrome.
5.1 Other use
Apart from the privacy threat, it can be a useful tool as well. For instance to make
people aware of the possibility they have a disease, such as Diabetes. In the Nether-
lands, there are 740.000 patients who have Diabetes, and probably 250.000 people who
have it, but are not aware of thisa.
References
[1] Mark A. Acree. Is there a gender difference in fingerprint ridge density? Forensic
Science International, 102(1):35 – 44, 1999.
[2] Angela Bell. Loop ridge count differences between genders. LOOP RIDGE
COUNT DIFFERENCES, 2008.
[3] Esperanza Gutie´rrez-Redomero, Concepcio´n Alonso, Esther Romero, and Virginia
Galera. Variability of fingerprint ridge density in a sample of spanish caucasians
and its application to sex determination. Forensic Science International, 180(1):17
– 22, 2008.
[4] J. A. Y. Hal and D. Kimura. Dermatoglyphic asymmetry and sexual orientation
in men. Behavioral Neuroscience, 108(6):1203–1206, 1994.
[5] Sarah B. Holt. Genetics of dermal ridges: Frequency distributions of total finger
ridge-count. Annals of Human Genetics, 20(2):159–170, 1955.
[6] Anil K. Jain, Karthik Nandakumar, and Abhishek Nagar. Biometric template
security. EURASIP J. Adv. Signal Process, 2008:1–17, 2008.
[7] Erika. McCallister, Tim. Grance, Karen Scarfone, National Institute of Standards,
and Technology (U.S.). Guide to protecting the confidentiality of Personally Iden-
tifiable Information (PII): recommendations of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology. Special Publication 800-122. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 2009.
[8] S. Gungadin MD. Sex determination from fingerprint ridge density. Internet
Journal of Medical Update, 2(2), 2007.
ahttp://www.diabetesfonds.nl/artikel/diabetes-cijfers
[9] M. Mehdipour and D.D. Farhud. A dermatoglyphic study of iranian muslims part
i: Finger patterns and ridge-counts. Iranian Journal of Public Health, 7(4):196 –
206, 1978.
[10] Brian S. Mustanski, J. Michael Bailey, and Sarah Kaspar. Dermatoglyphics, hand-
edness, sex, and sexual orientation. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 31(1):113–122,
02 2002.
[11] Vinod C. Nayak, Prateek Rastogi, Tanuj Kanchan, Stany W. Lobo, K. Yo-
ganarasimha, Smitha Nayak, Nageshkumar G. Rao, G. Pradeep Kumar,
B. Suresh Kumar Shetty, and Ritesh G. Menezes. Sex differences from fingerprint
ridge density in the indian population. Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine,
17(2):84 – 86, 2010.
[12] Vinod C. Nayak, Prateek Rastogi, Tanuj Kanchan, K. Yoganarasimha, G. Pradeep
Kumar, and Ritesh G. Menezes. Sex differences from fingerprint ridge density in
chinese and malaysian population. Forensic science international, 197(1):67–69,
04 2010.
[13] Edwin A. Ohler and Harold Cummins. Sexual differences in breadths of epider-
mal ridges on finger tips and palms. American Journal of Physical Anthropology,
29(3):341–362, 1942.
[14] Robert G. Orwin. A fail-safe n for effect size in meta-analysis. Journal of Educa-
tional and Behavioral Statistics, 8(2):157–159, 1983.
[15] D. F. Roberts, V. Luttrell, and C. Pasternak Slater. 6. finger prints in a greek
sample. Man, 65:21–22, 1965.
[16] Geoff Sanders and Flavie Waters. Fingerprint asymmetry predicts within sex dif-
ferences in the performance of sexually dimorphic tasks. Personality and Individual
Differences, 31(7):1181 – 1191, 2001.
[17] P.R. Sharma, A. K. Gautam, and P. K. Tiwari. Dermatoglyphic variations in five
ethno-geographical cohorts of indian populations: A pilot study. The Internet
Journal of Biological Anthropolog, 2(1), 2008.
[18] A. J. Simpson and M. J. Fitter. What is the best index of detectability?. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 80(6):481 – 488, 1973.
[19] John A. Swets. Form of empirical rocs in discrimination and diagnostic tasks:
Implications for theory and measurement of performance. Psychological Bulletin,
99(2):181 – 198, 1986.
[20] John A. Swets. Indices of discrimination or diagnostic accuracy: Their rocs and
implied models. Psychological Bulletin, 99(1):100 – 117, 1986.
